Intueri, ergo cogito,

cogitando intueri

Preterea. Dicere nichil aliud est summo spiritui quam cogitando intueri, ut dicit Dyonisius; sed cogitatio in nobis representat uerbum Dei: ergo ad representandum uerbum Dei, magis debuit poni cogitatio quam intelligentia.  Sancti Thomae de Aquino Lectura Romana in primum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi

Intuition in decision making

In psychology, intuition can encompass the ability to know valid solutions to problems and decision making. For example, the Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) model was described by Gary Klein in order to explain how people can make relatively fast decisions without having to compare options. Klein found that under time pressure, high stakes, and changing parameters, experts used their base of experience to identify similar situations and intuitively choose feasible solutions. Thus, the RPD model is a blend of intuition and analysis. The intuition is the pattern-matching process that quickly suggests feasible courses of action. The analysis is the mental simulation, a conscious and deliberate review of the courses of action.

An important intuitive method for identifying options is brainstorming.

Intuition is sometimes popularly thought of as the sixth sense. Apparently there are many unconscious processes occurring within a person and when those unconscious signals become strong enough, a conscious thought is experienced. For example, a person might be walking in a dark alley and suddenly, she gets the feeling that something is wrong. Her intuition has become strong enough to warn her about the possible danger. The information that contributes to the intuition comes from different hardly noticeable observations about the environment that a person doesn't consciously register.

 

 

Decision making

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Decision making is the cognitive process leading to the selection of a course of action among alternatives. Every decision making process produces a final choice. It can be an action or an opinion. It begins when we need to do something but we do not know what. Therefore, decision making is a reasoning process which can be rational or irrational, and can be based on explicit assumptions or tacit assumptions.

Common examples include shopping, deciding what to eat, when to sleep, and deciding whom or what to vote for in an election or referendum.

Decision making is said to be a psychological construct. This means that although we can never "see" a decision, we can infer from observable behaviour that a decision has been made. Therefore, we conclude that a psychological event that we call "decision making" has occurred. It is a construction that imputes commitment to action. That is, based on observable actions, we assume that people have made a commitment to affect the action.

Structured rational decision making is an important part of all science-based professions, where specialists apply their knowledge in a given area to making informed decisions. For example, medical decision making often involves making a diagnosis and selecting an appropriate treatment. Some research using naturalistic methods shows, however, that in situations with higher time pressure, higher stakes, or increased ambiguities, experts use intuitive decision making rather than structured approaches, following a recognition primed decision approach to fit a set of indicators into the expert's experience and immediately arrive at a satisfactory course of action without weighing alternatives.

Due to the large number of considerations involved in many decisions, computer-based decision support systems have been developed to assist decision makers in considering the implications of various courses of thinking. They can help reduce the risk of human errors. The systems which try to realize some human/cognitive decision making functions are called Intelligent Decision Support Systems (IDSS), see for ex. "An Approach to the Intelligent Decision Advisor (IDA) for Emergency Managers, 1999".

 

 

Recognition Primed Decision

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The Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model was described by Gary Klein in order to explain how people can make relatively fast decisions without having to compare options. Previously, decision researchers had argued that unless people used some sort of decision analysis or multi-attribute utility analysis, their decisions would be inadequate and prone to biases. Klein and his colleagues studied the way experienced fireground commanders made difficult decisions under time pressure and uncertainty. The researchers speculated that the commanders only compared two options instead of a full range of options. However, the firefighters insisted that they rarely compared any options at all. This created two mysteries – how could the firefighters be so confident of the first option that popped into their heads, and how could they evaluate an option without comparing it to another option?

By reviewing incident accounts collected through cognitive task analysis, for 156 decision points collected from 26 highly experienced commanders averaging 23 years as firefighters, the researchers determined that the commanders had accumulated a large repertoire of patterns and could use these patterns to rapidly categorize situations. Once the situation was understood, the commanders knew, through experience, how to respond. That resolved the first mystery.

The incident accounts also showed that the commanders evaluated an option by conducting a mental simulation to see if it would work. If the mental simulation looked good, the commanders would take action. If the mental simulation showed flaws in the course of action, the commanders would revise and improve the option. And if they couldn’t find a way to eliminate the flaws, the commanders would look at the next option in the action queue, continuing until they found one that looked like it would work. That resolved the second mystery. The commanders evaluated options by imagining them in the context of the current situation.

The RPD model is a blend of intuition and analysis. The intuition is the pattern-matching process that quickly suggests feasible courses of action. The analysis is the mental simulation, a conscious and deliberate review of the courses of action. In this way, the RPD model is compatible with the System 1/System 2 framework suggested by Daniel Kahneman and others.

Brainstorming is a group creativity technique that was intended to be a method for generating ideas for the solution of a problem. Brainstorming originated in 1957 in a book called Applied Imagination by Alex Faickney Osborn, an advertising executive.[1]

Brainstorming has become so well known that the word is part of our everyday language. Unfortunately, the specific methods of brainstorming have generally failed to demonstrate any measurable superiority under controlled, experimental conditions. Neverthless, Brainstorming remains a popular and commonly used technique in a variety of corporate settings.

Blue-Sky Thinking is similar to brainstorming. Other methods of generating ideas are individual ideation and the morphological analysis approach.

 

Intuition in philosophy

In the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, intuition is one of the basic cognitive faculties, equivalent to what might loosely be called perception. Kant held that our mind casts all of our external intuitions in the form of space, and all of our internal intuitions (memory, thought) in the form of time.

Intuitionism is a position in philosophy of mathematics derived from Kant's claim that all mathematical knowledge is knowledge of the pure forms of the intuition - that is, intuition that is not empirical (Prolegomena, p.7).

Intuitionistic logics are a class of logics, devised and advanced by Arend Heyting and Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer and more recently by Michael Dummett, to accommodate intuitionism about mathematics (as well as anti-realism more generally). These logics are characterized by rejecting the law of excluded middle: as a consequence they do not in general accept rules such as disjunctive syllogism and reductio ad absurdum. Intuitionism is a form of constructivism.

A situation which is or appears to be true but violates our intuition is called a paradox (a paradox can also be a logical self-contradiction). An example of this is the Birthday paradox.

A few systems act in a counter-intuitive way. Attempts to change such systems often lead to unintended consequences.

Intuition does not mean to find a solution immediately, though it does mean the solution comes inexplicably. Sometimes it helps to sleep one night. There is an old Russian

 maxim: "The morning is wiser than the evening" ("Утро вечера мудренее"). However, it is up to one's own intuition to decide when to act.

Intuition plays a key role in Romanticism, and it is the highest form of skill acquisition in the Dreyfus and Dreyfus model.

 

Mind refers to the collective aspects of intellect and consciousness which are manifest in some combination of thought, perception, emotion, will and imagination.

There are many theories of what the mind is and how it works, dating back to Plato, Aristotle and other Ancient Greek and Indian philosophers. Pre-scientific theories, which were rooted in theology, concentrated on the relationship between the mind and the soul, the supposed supernatural or divine essence of the human person. Modern theories, based on a scientific understanding of the brain, see the mind as a phenomenon of psychology, and the term is often used more or less synonymously with consciousness.

The question of which human attributes make up the mind is also much debated. Some argue that only the "higher" intellectual functions constitute mind: particularly reason and memory. In this view the emotions - love, hate, fear, joy - are more "primitive" or subjective in nature and should be seen as different in nature or origin to the mind. Others argue that the rational and the emotional sides of the human person cannot be separated, that they are of the same nature and origin, and that they should all be considered as part of the individual mind.

 

 

Cognition

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Look up Cognition in
Wiktionary, the free dictionary.

The term cognition (Latin: cognoscere, "to know") is used in several loosely related ways to refer to a faculty for the human-like processing of information, applying knowledge and changing preferences. Cognition/(cognitive processes) can be natural and artificial, conscious and not conscious; therefore, they are analyzed from different perspectives and in different contexts, in anesthesia, neurology, psychology, philosophy, systemics and computer science. The concept of cognition is closely related to such abstract concepts as mind, reasoning, perception, intelligence, learning, and many others that describe numerous capabilities of human mind and expected properties of artificial or synthetic intelligence. Cognition is an abstract property of advanced living organisms; therefore, it is studied as a direct property of a brain or of an abstract mind on subsymbolic and symbolic levels.

In psychology and in artificial intelligence, it is used to refer to the mental functions, mental processes and states of intelligent entities (humans, human organizations, highly autonomous robots), with a particular focus toward the study of such mental processes as comprehension, inferencing, decision-making, planning and learning (see also cognitive science and cognitivism). Recently, advanced cognitive researchers have been especially focused on the capacities of abstraction, generalization, concretization/specialization and meta-reasoning which descriptions involve such concepts as beliefs, knowledge, desires, preferences and intentions of intelligent individuals/objects/agents/systems.

The term "cognition" is also used in a wider sense to mean the act of knowing or knowledge, and may be interpreted in a social or cultural sense to describe the emergent development of knowledge and concepts within a group that culminate in both thought and action.

 

Knowledge

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For the study of London undertaken by prospective taxi drivers, see The Knowledge.

 

Personification of knowledge (Greek Επιστημη, Episteme) in Celsus Library in Ephesos, Turkey.

Knowledge is what is known. Like the related concepts truth, belief, and wisdom, there is no single definition of knowledge on which scholars agree, but rather numerous theories and continued debate about the nature of knowledge.

Knowledge acquisition involves complex cognitive processes: perception, learning, communication, association, and reasoning. The term knowledge is also used to mean the confident understanding of a subject, potentially with the ability to use it for a specific purpose.

Defining knowledge

See also: epistemology

We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that the fact could not be other than it is. Now that scientific knowing is something of this sort is evident-witness both those who falsely claim it and those who actually possess it, since the former merely imagine themselves to be, while the latter are also actually, in the condition described. Consequently the proper object of unqualified scientific knowledge is something which cannot be other than it is.

 

Aristotle, Posterior Analytics (Book 1 Part 2)

 

The definition of knowledge is a live debate for philosophers. The classical definition, found in Plato[1], has it that in order for there to be knowledge at least three criteria must be fulfilled; that in order to count as knowledge, a statement must be justified, true, and believed. Some claim that these conditions are not sufficient, as Gettier case examples allegedly demonstrate. There are a number of alternatives proposed, including Robert Nozick's arguments for a requirement that knowledge 'tracks the truth' and Simon Blackburn's additional requirement that we do not want to say that those who meet any of these conditions 'through a defect, flaw, or failure' have knowledge. Richard Kirkham suggests that our definition of knowledge requires that the believer's evidence is such that it logically necessitates the truth of the belief.

In contrast to this approach, Wittgenstein observed, following Moore's paradox, that one can say "He believes it, but it isn't so", but not "He knows it, but it isn't so". [2] He goes on to argue that these do not correspond to distinct mental states, but rather to distinct ways of talking about conviction. What is different here is not the mental state of the speaker, but the activity in which they are engaged. For example, on this account, to know that the kettle is boiling is not to be in a particular state of mind, but to perform a particular task with the statement that the kettle is boiling. Wittgenstein sought to bypass the difficulty of definition by looking to the way "knowledge" is used in natural languages. He saw knowledge as a case of a family resemblance.

 

 

 

Extra-sensory perception

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Extra-sensory perception, or ESP, is defined in parapsychology as the ability to acquire information by means other than the five main senses of taste, sight, touch, smell, and hearing, such as telepathy, clairvoyance and precognition.[1] The term implies sources of information currently unknown to science. Extra-sensory perception is also sometimes referred to as a sixth sense (as in coming after the first five listed, which are considered the five "classical" senses). The active agent through which the mind is able to receive ESP impressions has been named psi (Ψ, ψ).[2]

 

Perception

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In psychology and the cognitive sciences, perception is the process of acquiring, interpreting, selecting, and organizing sensory information. The word perception comes from the Latin capere, meaning "to take," the prefix per meaning "completely." Methods of studying perception range from essentially biological or physiological approaches, through psychological approaches through the philosophy of mind and in empiricist epistemology, such as that of David Hume, John Locke, George Berkeley, or as in Merleau Ponty's affirmation of perception as the basis of all science and knowledge.

Romanticism

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Romanticism is an artistic and intellectual movement that originated in late 18th century Western Europe. In part a revolt against aristocratic, social, and political norms of the Enlightenment period and a reaction against the rationalization of nature, in art and literature it stressed strong emotion as a source of aesthetic experience, placing new emphasis on such emotions as trepidation, horror, and the awe experienced in confronting the sublimity of nature. It elevated folk art, nature and custom, as well as arguing for an epistemology based on usage and custom. It was influenced by ideas of the Enlightenment and elevated medievalism and elements of art and narrative perceived to be from the medieval period. The name "romantic" itself comes from the term "romance" which is a prose or poetic heroic narrative originating in medieval literature.

The ideologies and events of the French Revolution are thought to have influenced the movement. Romanticism elevated the achievements of what it perceived as misunderstood heroic individuals and artists that altered society. It also legitimized the individual imagination as a critical authority which permitted freedom from classical notions of form in art. There was a strong recourse to historical and natural inevitability in the representation of its ideas.

Many intellectual historians have seen Romanticism as a key moment in the Counter-Enlightenment, or the reaction against the Age of Enlightenment. Whereas the thinkers of the Enlightenment emphasized the primacy of deductive reason, Romanticism emphasized intuition, imagination, and feeling, to a point that has led to some Romantic thinkers being accused of irrationalism.

 

 

Positivism

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For other meanings of positivism, see positivism (disambiguation).

Positivism is a philosophy developed by Auguste Comte (widely regarded as the first true sociologist) in the middle of the 19th century that stated that the only authentic knowledge is scientific knowledge, and that such knowledge can only come from positive affirmation of theories through strict scientific method. This view is sometimes referred to as a scientist ideology, and is often shared by technocrats who believe in the necessary progress through scientific progress, and by naturalists, who argue that any method for gaining knowledge should be limited to natural, physical, and material approaches. As an approach to the philosophy of science deriving from Enlightenment thinkers like Pierre-Simon Laplace (and many others), positivism was first systematically theorized by Comte, who saw the scientific method as replacing metaphysics in the history of thought, and who observed the circular dependence of theory and observation in science. Comte was thus one of the leading thinkers of the social evolutionism thought. Brazil's national motto, Ordem e Progresso ("Order and Progress") was taken from Comte's positivism, also influential in Poland. Positivism is the most evolved stage of society in anthropological Evolutionism, the point where science and rational explanation for scientific phenomena develops. Marxism and predictive dialectics is a highly positivist system of theory. However Marxism rejects positivism and views it as subjective idealism, because it limits itself only to facts and does not examine the underlying causes of things.

 

 

Naturalism (philosophy)

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This article is about methodological naturalism. For metaphysical naturalism, see Metaphysical naturalism.

Naturalism is any of several philosophical stances, typically those descended from materialism and pragmatism, that do not distinguish the supernatural (including strange entities like non-natural values, and universals as they are commonly conceived) from nature. Naturalism does not necessarily claim that phenomena or hypotheses commonly labeled as supernatural do not exist or are wrong, but insists that all phenomena and hypotheses can be studied by the same methods and therefore anything considered supernatural is either nonexistent, unknowable, or not inherently different from natural phenomena or hypotheses.

Any method of inquiry or investigation or any procedure for gaining knowledge that limits itself to natural, physical, and material approaches and explanations can be described as naturalistic.

Many modern philosophers of science[1][2] use the terms methodological naturalism or scientific naturalism to refer to the long standing convention in science of the scientific method, which makes the methodological assumption that observable effects in nature are best explainable only by similarly natural causes, and with irrelevance to the assumption of the existence or non-existence of supernatural elements, and so considers supernatural explanations for such events to be outside of science. They contrast this with the approach known as ontological naturalism or metaphysical naturalism, which refers to the metaphysical belief that the natural world (including the universe) is all that exists, and therefore nothing supernatural exists.

This distinction between approaches to the philosophy of naturalism is made by philosophers supporting science and evolution in the creation–evolution controversy to counter the tendency of some proponents of Creationism or intelligent design to refer to methodological naturalism as scientific materialism or as methodological materialism and conflate it with metaphysical naturalism to support their claim that modern science is atheistic. They contrast this with their preferred approach of a revived natural philosophy which welcomes supernatural explanations for natural phenomena and supports "theistic science" or pseudoscience.

 

Cogito ergo sum

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René Descartes (15961650)

"Cogito, ergo sum" (Latin: "I think, therefore I am") is a philosophical statement used by René Descartes, which became a foundational element of Western philosophy. "Cogito ergo sum" is a translation of Descartes' original French statement: "Je pense, donc je suis", which occurs in his Discourse on Method (1637).

Although the idea expressed in "cogito ergo sum" is widely attributed to Descartes, many predecessors offer similar arguments—particularly St. Augustine of Hippo in De Civitate Dei (books XI, 26), who also anticipates modern refutations of the concept. (See Principles of Philosophy, §7: "Ac proinde haec cognitio, ego cogito, ergo sum, est omnium prima et certissima etc.").

Introduction

The phrase "cogito ergo sum" is not used in Descartes' most important work, the Meditations on First Philosophy, but the term "the cogito" is (often confusingly) used to refer to an argument from it. Descartes felt that this phrase, which he had used in his earlier Discourse, had been misleading in its implication that he was appealing to an inference, so he changed it to "I am, I exist" (also often called "the first certainty") in order to avoid the term "cogito".

At the beginning of the second meditation, having reached what he considers to be the ultimate level of doubt – his argument from the existence of a deceiving god – Descartes examines his beliefs to see if any has survived the doubt. In his belief in his own existence he finds it: it is impossible to doubt that he exists. Even if there were a deceiving god (or an evil demon, the tool he uses to stop himself sliding back into ungrounded beliefs), his belief in his own existence would be secure, for how could he be deceived unless he existed in order to be deceived?

"But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something [or thought anything at all] then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So, after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that the proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind." (AT VII 25; CSM II 16–17)

There are three important notes to keep in mind here. First, he only claims the certainty of his own existence from the first-person point of view — he has not proved the existence of other minds at this point. This is something that has to be thought through by each of us for ourselves, as we follow the course of the meditations. Second, he is not saying that his existence is necessary; he is saying that if he's thinking, then necessarily he exists (see the instantiation principle). Third, this proposition "I am, I exist" is held true not based on a deduction (as mentioned above) nor on empirical induction, but on the clarity and self-evidence of the proposition.

Descartes does not use this first certainty, the cogito, as a foundation upon which to build further knowledge; rather, it is the firm ground upon which he can stand as he works to restore his beliefs. As he puts it:

"Archimedes used to demand just one firm and immovable point in order to shift the entire earth; so I too can hope for great things if I manage to find just one thing, however slight, that is certain and unshakeable." (AT VII 24; CSM II 16)

According to many Descartes specialists including Etienne Gilson, the goal of Descartes in establishing this first truth is to demonstrate the capacity of his criterion -the immediate clarity and distinctiveness of self-evident propositions- to establish true and justified propositions despite having adopted a method of generalized doubt. As a consequence of this demonstration, Descartes considers science and mathematics to be justified to the extent that their proposals are established on a similar immediate clarity, distinctiveness, and self-evidence that present itself to the mind. The originality of Descartes thinking, therefore, is not so much in expressing the cogito -a feat accomplished by other predecessors, as we have seen- but on using the cogito as demonstrating the most fundamental epistemological principle, that science and mathematics are justified by relying on clarity, distinctiveness, and self-evidence.

[edit] History of the Quotation

In Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy, he employs hyperbolic doubt to re-establish his existence. Through hyperbolic doubt, he disbands his belief in the existence of everything that has questionable existence. His purpose is to rebuild the true things in the world. With everything doubted and falsifed, anything recognized as true will completely be true and there can be no doubt about its validity. Through his method, he derives his first major saying "dubito sum" meaning "I doubt, I am". He recognizes that to be able to doubt, he must exist--within the doubting, there is existence, and vice versa. And as doubting is a form of thinking, "cogito sum" was born.

Contrary to popular belief, Descartes never said the phrase "cogito ergo sum." Rather, he said "cogito, sum", which got lost in the translation from French to Latin to English. "Cogito ergo sum" translates as "I think therefore I am" which implies that existence is the effect of the cause of thinking, which is a philosophical fallacy. This jargon is equivalent to making existence a quality with which can be put on an object. [E.g. This ball is red, round, filled with air, and (oh by the way) it exists.] Contrarily, "cogito, sum" translates as "I think, I am" meaning that in doing the thinking, he is also existing at the same time. The thinking and the existing are simultaneous and not causal. Through this point, Descartes has found a point to his Archimedean lever and thus can extrapolate his next major point, the "res cogitans." Which is thus followed by the great deceptor, the existence of God, and the re-establishment of the material world.

He isn't saying that existence necessarily exists because of God like Umansky's argument. That's a different a argument that came before the cogito where he stated that it's possible that an evil demon could be controlling our perceptions and because of that we have no way to know for sure that this isn't true. What Descartes was trying to do was refute the skeptical argument that knowledge is not possible, because skepticism was basically irrefutable at that point in time. What the cogito was, was an argument that transcended the skaptics tools of doubt. He wasn't attempting to prove the existence of god, he was attempting to refute the skeptics. The cogito, as previously said, is the statement translated to "I think, therefore I am." What is failed to be explained is that, what this means, is that just because he is able to think means that he exists in one form or another. This doesn't infer the properties of his existence, it just means he, one way or another, exists. How does he know this? Because he is able to think that thought. All it means is if you are able to think you deductively know that you somehow exist as a consciousness because you couldn't have one if there was no such thing as existence. And, in fact, by thinking about such a concept you are proving him right. This is because by thinking you prove you have a consciousness and by having a consciousness you prove that you somehow exist. Whether this is as you perceive your existence or maybe you're just a brain floating in the vat like you're in the matrix. It is impossible to think if you don't exist somehow. So by thinking you prove that you exist in some way. This doesn't imply that there must be a God unless you yourself infer that there must necessarily be a God for there to be an existence, which I'm not refuting. I'm merely stating that you can't say the cogito was made to prove that there was a god. He made Ontological arguments for that 'fact.' All the cogito meant to do was to appease the 'knowledge is a true justified belief' requirements of knowledge in epistemology and show that skepticism is wrong.

[edit] Criticisms of the cogito

There have been a number of criticisms of the cogito. The first of the two under scrutiny here concerns the nature of the step from "I am thinking" to "I exist". The contention is that this is a syllogistic inference, for it appears to require the extra premise: "Whatever has the property of thinking, exists", and that extra premise must surely have been rejected at an earlier stage of the doubt.

It could be argued that "Whatever has the property of thinking, exists" is self-evident, and thus not subject to the method of doubt. This is because the instantiation principle states that: "Whatever has the property F, exists", but within the method of doubt, only the property of thinking is indubitably a property of the meditator. Descartes does not make use of this defence, however; as we have already seen, he responds to the criticism by conceding that there would indeed be an extra premise needed, but denying that the cogito is a syllogism. Jaakko Hintikka offered a non-syllogistic interpretation. "I exist" is immune to Descartes' method of doubt because it is impossible to be mistaken about one's own existence. If we don't exist then we can't be mistaken, so we might as well believe we do.

Perhaps a more relevant contention is whether the 'I' to which Descartes refers is justified. In Descartes, The Project of Pure Enquiry Bernard Williams provides a history and full evaluation of this issue. The main objection, as presented by Georg Lichtenberg, is that rather than supposing an entity that is thinking, Descartes should have said: "thinking is occurring." That is, whatever the force of the cogito, Descartes draws too much from it; the existence of a thinking thing, the reference of the "I", is more than the cogito can justify.

Williams provides a meticulous and exhaustive examination of this objection. He argues, first, that it is impossible to make sense of "there is thinking" without relativising it to something. It seems at first as though this something needn't be a thinker, the "I", but Williams goes through each of the possibilities, demonstrating that none of them can do the job. He concludes that Descartes is justified in his formulation (though possibly without realising why that was so).

Note, however, that there is a more fundamental potential refutation to the cogito; i.e., namely of the thesis that 'perception' requires 'thinking.' If the solipsist were merely being created instantaneously from moment to moment with all memory intact and updated, he would only think he is 'thinking' — i.e., have a perception of thinking. In fact, no operation or activity has truly taken place from percept to percept (think of how the 'still' frames of a moving picture film strip blend into the appearance of motion) — only the passage of time.

[edit] Williams' argument

Whilst the preceding two arguments against the cogito fail, other arguments have been advanced by Williams. He claims, for example, that what we are dealing with when we talk of thought, or when we say "I am thinking", is something conceivable from a third-person perspective; namely objective "thought-events" in the former case, and an objective thinker in the latter.

The obvious problem is that, through introspection, or our experience of consciousness, we have no way of moving to conclude the existence of any third-personal fact, verification of which would require a thought necessarily impossible, being, as Descartes is, bound to the evidence of his own consciousness alone.

[edit] Umansky's argument

Another flaw in Descartes' method, which perhaps invalidates all he hoped to achieve, is the fact that though he claimed that the ultimate level of doubt was assuming God to be a great deceiver rather than a benevolent creator, he never doubted the existence of God, only His attitude towards humanity. This is the flaw of cognito; since he states in his introduction to the Meditations, that he feels it necessary to try, as all good Christian philosophers should, to logically prove the existence of God. This was his true intent; to prove the existence of God. To doubt the existence of everything was only for the purpose of trying to find out what could be objectively true, and since Descartes was a believer in God, he was not interested in doubting His existence. Rather, he was trying to prove the existence of something, namely God, who he was already convinced did exist. Therefore God was immune to the radical doubt he employed to doubt the existence of all things, even though God, regardless of qualities ascribed to Him, must be included in the set that includes all things.

So if cognito, sum is is dependent upon Descartes' proving that everything can be doubted except the existence of doubt itself, and he never truly doubted the existence of God, then cognito, sum is dependent upon the existence of a Creator Being, and is therefore not necessarily true.